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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Nielsen is entitled to two uninsured motorist (UM) coverages
under his policy with Metropolitan. The very provision present in
the Nielsen policy has been found ambiguous by other courts.
Additionally, Richard Nielsen's testimony as to his reasonable
expectations of two coverages was uncontroverted
court,

and

is

supported

by

the

case

law

in the lower

and

commentary.

Metropolitan's attempt to refute Nielsen's testimony creates, at
best, a factual issue to be decided by a jury.
Nielsen is also entitled to coverage under the $500,000 limit
for "each accident."
to

define

the

The language in question is vague and fails

critical

term

relied

upon

by

Metropolitan.

Furthermore, Metropolitan uses that term to mean different things
both in its brief and elsewhere in the policy.

Accordingly, the

language is ambiguous and must be construed in Nielsen's favor.
Metropolitan

cannot

establish

that

Nielsen

knowingly

and

voluntarily relinquished his right to claim coverage under the
"each accident" limit, and thus Nielsen has not waived his right to
make that argument.

At the very least, the district court must

make specific findings as to whether such a waiver occurred.
Because Metropolitan's obligation to Nielsen is contractual,
Nielsen is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the entire amount
of

the

obligation.

Metropolitan's
1

attempt

to

characterize

Nielsen's claim for coverage as a personal

injury action is

contrary to this Court's own pronouncements that the UM coverage
relationship is based upon contract.

As with other contract

disputes, the fact that Metropolitan disputed the extent of its
liability does not preclude imposition of pre-judgment interest.
In the alternative, Nielsen

is entitled

to pre-judgment

interest on the amount of his special damages.
opposition

to

interpretation

this

point

of the term

is

based

Metropolitan's

upon

an

"damages" as used

unrealistic

in the policy.

Furthermore, case law supports the award of pre-judgment interest
where an insurance company knows or should know that the insured is
entitled to be paid policy limits but refuses to tender that
amount.

It is at the very least a factual issue.

Finally, the

award of pre-judgment interest is statutorily mandated, and thus
Metropolitan cannot avoid payment through contrary contractual
provision.
ARGUMENT
Objection To New Evidence Submitted On Appeal By Respondent
Metropolitan

has attached

to

its brief

an

affidavit of

Metropolitan's counsel, including exhibits, which was not presented
in the court below.
Metropolitan's

The affidavit appears for the first time in

brief.

Under

well-established

principles

of

appellate review, Metropolitan cannot rely upon material never
2

presented to the district court in attempting to support the lower
courts order of summary judgment. Pilcher v. Department of Social
Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983).
It should also be noted that the new material is offered by
Metropolitan to refute the evidence adduced below as to Richard
Nielsen's

reasonable

expectations.

inappropriate for three reasons.

Metropolitan's

effort

is

First, the district court was

required to view the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to Nielsen.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737

P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).

Second, the evidence as to Nielsen's

reasonable expectations was uncontroverted in the lower court.
Metropolitan was obligated at the trial court to submit countering
affidavits or other evidence in response to Nielsen's affidavit.
U.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

Metropolitan's failure to do so warranted the

entry of summary judgment in favor of Nielsen. Third, it would be
a dangerous precedent to allow a party in a civil case to submit
new evidence on appeal. No judgment below would ever be factually
final and all parties would have incentive to bolster their
position on appeal with new evidence.

3

I.
A.

THE NIELSEN POLICY HAS TWO LIMITS OF
$250,000/500,000 FOR UM COVERAGE.

The policy language in question permits stacking.

Metropolitan characterizes the issue in Point I as whether the
district court correctly ruled "that stacking of uninsured motorist
benefits was not allowed in Utah."

The actual issue, however, is

whether the language in the particular policy purchased by Richard
Nielsen

in

1982

permits

stacking

of

the

uninsured

motorist

coverages provided in the policy.
The principle case relied upon by Metropolitan supports the
conclusion that the availability of stacking (prior to enactment of
the anti-stacking statute in 1985) hinges on the particular policy
language at issue.

In Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454

P.2d 294 (1969), this Court determined that, under the terms of the
particular policy construed, stacking of UM coverages was properly
denied:
There appears to be no ambiguity or uncertainty in the
provision just quoted. It being thus set forth as part
of the insurance contract, in clear and understandable
terms, that where the Company has issued more than one
policy to an insured, it will be liable only up to the
maximum coverage of its highest limit on any one policy
for any one accident or loss, it is the duty of the
courts to give it effect.
Id., 454 P.2d at 295.
Contrary to Metropolitan's assertion, Martin does not bar
stacking regardless of the policy
4

language.

Instead,

it is

apparent from the Court's opinion that the availability of stacking
depended upon the specific language present in the policy, which,
in Martin, the Court found unambiguous.
The anti-stacking provision of Martin expressly applied to
"any other insurance policy or policies issued to the insured by
the company . . . "

Id. at 295.

The plaintiff in that case had

purchased two separate insurance policies. It is not difficult to
see why this Court found no ambiguity.
Metropolitan suggests that the language in the Nielsen policy
is "virtually identical" to that in Martin. However, Metropolitan
quotes the wrong section of the insurance policy to support this
assertion.

The provision in Nielsen7s policy governing "other

insurance" in the uninsured motorist context is found in a section
labeled OTHER INSURANCE.

(Policy, p. 12) .

Metropolitan ignores

this provision in the UM section, preferring to have this Court
construe the "other insurance" provision in the general conditions
section. Metropolitan does not refute Nielsens analysis of the UM
provision.

As demonstrated below, the clause is ambiguous.

Metropolitan seeks to limit UM coverage based upon what it
claims to be other available insurance.1
1

The "other insurance11

The applicable UM provision was quoted and discussed at
length in Nielsen's opening brief, but is completely ignored by
Metropolitan in its Brief. Metropolitan provides no explanation
for why the UM "other insurance" provision is in the policy if the
issue is actually supposed to be governed by the general conditions
5

provision in the UM section has two separate subdivisions, one
labeled

"Automobile

Liability

and

Automobile

Medical

Expense

Coverages" and the other labeled "Protection Against Uninsured
Motorists

Coverage."

Only

the

latter

section

specifically

addresses the present case. The first paragraph of this provision
states:
Protection Against Uninsured Motorist Coverage
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying a highway vehicle not owned by the named
insured, the insurance under the Protection Against
Uninsured Motorist Coverage shall apply only as excess
insurance over any other similar insurance available to
such insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary
insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in
the amount by which the limit of liability for this
coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of
such other insurance.
In this case, the Nielsens were not occupying a vehicle owned
by another when the accident occurred.

Accordingly, the second

paragraph of the provision comes into play:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if
the insured has other similar insurance available to him
and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance and such other insurance,
section. Moreover, even if the paragraph cited by Metropolitan did
encompass UM coverage within its scope, the policy language
expressly governing UM coverage is controlling, as a clarification
or modification of the more general provision cited by
Metropolitan.
United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance
Company of America, 681 P.2d 390, 425-26 (Ariz.App. 1983); Waterway
Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical Contractors, 406 P.2d 556,
566 (Ore. 1965, en banc); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
203(c).
6

and METROPOLITAN shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of any loss to which this Protection Against
Uninsured Motorists Coverage applies than the limit of
liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance.
This "other insurance" provision is quite dissimilar to the
applicable provision in Martin.

The identical provision has been

found ambiguous by other courts, including U. S. District Court
Judge Aldon J. Anderson in Ainae v. Allstate Insurance Co., Civ.
No. C-80-211A (July 21, 1981).

In Ainge, Judge Anderson rejected

the construction of Martin advocated by Metropolitan, noting that
the language of the policy in the latter case expressly applied to
other policies issued "by the Company."

In contrast, a policy

without such language was ambiguous as to the effect of the
additional premiums.

(Ainge at 4, R. 387). An ambiguous provision

cannot satisfy the requirement that an insurer wishing to limit
coverage must do so through "exclusions phrased in language which
clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific
circumstances

under which the expected

coverage will not be

provided." Wagner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 786 P.2d 763, 765
(Utah App. 1990).
The Arkansas Supreme Court, also construing an identical
provision, reached the same conclusion in Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Arkansas v. Barnhill. 681 S.W.2d 341 (Ark.
1984) .

The court held that, unlike an "other insurance" clause
7

which states it applies to other insurance provided

"by the

company," an insured could not be expected to realize that "other
similar insurance" means "the very policy he is reading."

Id. at

342.2
Thus, while the Nielsen policy provision governing dual
coverages in the UM context has not been construed by a Utah
appellate court, the identical provision has been found ambiguous
by other courts.
alone

As the Court of Appeals has noted, that fact

suggests the

existence

of an ambiguity.

Metropolitan

Property & Liability Co. v. Finlayson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App.
1988), vacated as moot, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1989). At the very
least, it cannot be said that such a provision is clear and
unmistakable.
The general rule in Utah

is that payment of a premium

establishes prima facie entitlement to coverage.

Peterson v.

Western Casualty and Surety Co., 19 Utah 2d 26, 29, 425 P.2d 769,
770 (1967). The language of the Nielsen policy contains nothing to

2

The same problem is presented even by the policy language
relied upon by Metropolitan. The language says, "With respect to
any occurrence, accident or loss to which this and any other
automobile insurance policy issued to the named insured by
METROPOLITAN also applies, the total limit of METROPOLITAN'S
liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest
applicable limit of liability or benefit amount under any one such
policy." (Underlined emphasis added). Again, it is not reasonable
to argue that "any other policy" means the very policy the insured
is reading.
8

contradict that rule with respect to payment of the second premium.
Consequently, Nielsen's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted, and the district court erred in entering judgment in
favor of Metropolitan.
B.
At the very least, the district court's order erroneously
disregarded factual issues as to Richard Nielsen's reasonable
expectations.
In addition to the ambiguity in the policy, Nielsen argued
below

that he

is entitled

to two

coverages

because

reasonable expectations in paying two premiums.

of his

An insured's

reasonable expectations may override even a clear exclusion in the
policy.

Wagner. at 766.

Nielsen filed an affidavit explaining

that payment of two premiums created an expectation in him of
receiving

two coverages.

(R. 393-94).

This uncontroverted

affidavit was before the district court, and created at least a
factual issue which the court could not resolve through summary
judgment.
Metropolitan now asks this Court to resolve the factual issue
as well, arguing in its brief with new evidence that Nielsen did
not really have an expectation of two coverages.

As noted in the

Objection above, Metropolitan's argument is based on inappropriate
evidence which is not in the record.

Metropolitan did not raise

the argument in the lower court and therefore cannot raise it now

9

for the first time. Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754,
758 (Utah 1984).
Metropolitan's

argument

concerning

expectations has another basic flaw.

Nielsen's

reasonable

Metropolitan cites various

documents for the proposition that Nielsen actually believed the
limits were only $250,000, but none of the documents arose in a
discussion of the insurance company's liability under the policy.
These

were

settlement

negotiations

and

Nielsen

knew

that

Metropolitan would never settle for more than what it considered to
be the policy limit of $250,000. The issue was not resolved before
the

trial.

In

spite

of

the

Nielsens'

serious

injuries,

Metropolitan had made clear that it did not intend to offer even
the $250,000.

Consequently, it did not matter whether or when

Nielsen raised the issue of the insurance Metropolitan's actual
liability under the policy.
It should be noted, however, that Nielsen's uncontroverted
testimony as to his reasonable expectations is supported not only
by the cases cited, but by an authority in automobile insurance,
who explains:
Since uninsured motorist coverage, unlike liability
coverage, is linked to the person rather than an
automobile, it is not necessary for uninsured motorist
coverage that a motor vehicle insured in the policy be
involved in the accident. Coverage is available to an
insured while occupying any motor vehicle, whether owned
or nonowned, insured or uninsured, or while the insured
is afoot or on horseback.
10

As a result of this type of "portable" coverage, the
owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for
coverage applicable to only one of them secures coverage
for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured
vehicles as well as the insured vehicle. Thus, when he
pays separate and uniform premiums for vehicles #2 and
#3, he reasonably expects — and it is a fair inference - that he has purchased additional coverages coextensive
with and supplementing the insurance already available
under a single coverage.
Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability
Insurance,
Boardman,

Uninsured
2nd

ed.

Motorists,

1991,

Vol.

(underlined emphasis added).

Insurance

Compulsory
3,

§

- No-Fault

Coverage,

31.02[8],

p.

Clark

31-18.1.3

Sufficient evidence therefore exists

to support the conclusion that Nielsen's reasonable expectations
entitle him to two coverages.
Metropolitan apparently relies upon Martin to argue that an
insured cannot have reasonable expectations of two coverages even
when two premiums are paid.

The issue of separate premiums arose

in Martin only in conjunction with arguments that the insurer had
waived

the

limiting

provision,

and

that

the

financial

responsibility laws mandated minimum coverage for each premium.
The

concept

of

reasonable

expectations

3

was

never

raised

or

The premium for uninsured motorist coverage for the second
vehicle in Nielsen's policy was slightly lower than for the first
vehicle. As Schirmer notes, however, "[e]ven the payment of a
lesser premium for Vehicles #2 and #3 is not in and of itself
significant. This may simply reflect the saving in administrative
expense involved in writing one policy rather than several." id,
at p. 31-19.
11

addressed.

In fact, the doctrine was not formally recognized in

Utah until more than 20 years later.

See Wagner, supra.

Metropolitan also argues that "any lay person" could see that
stacking is not allowed under the policy. Metropolitans assertion
is directly refuted by (or insulting to) Judge Anderson and the
highest court in another jurisdiction, both of whom found this very
policy language ambiguous.
C.

Summary.

Metropolitan's argument that stacking was prohibited jln toto
is not supported by any of this Court's pronouncements.

Prior to

the anti-stacking statute, the availability of stacking is governed
by the language of the specific policy. In this case, the specific
provision governing UM coverage has been found ambiguous by at
least two other courts. Accordingly, Metropolitan is liable under
the policy for two coverages.
Nielsen's entitlement to two coverages is also supported by
the uncontroverted evidence of Nielsen's reasonable expectations.
In

addition

commentators

to

Nielsen's

have

own

recognized

testimony,
that

an

other

insured's

courts

and

reasonable

expectations in paying two premiums for uninsured motorist coverage
is to receive two coverages.4
4

Citing the subsequently enacted anti-stacking statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(6), Metropolitan "assumes" this court "will
not take a stance in contravention with [sic] the legislature."
12

For those reasons, the district court7s entry of summary
judgment in favor of Metropolitan should be reversed, and the case
remanded with instructions to enter judgment entitling Nielsen to
two coverages of $250,000/500,000 each.
II.

NIELSEN
IS ENTITLED TO THE "EACH
ACCIDENT" LIMIT OP $500/000 FOR EACH
COVERAGE.

Nielsen submits that the "each person/each accident" language
in the policy is ambiguous, and Nielsen is therefore entitled to
recover under the $500,000 "each accident" limit of coverage.

In

its brief, Metropolitan criticizes Nielsen for not citing any cases
involving identical policy language, but Metropolitan also fails to
cite any such cases. Of course, a logical explanation is that most
policies are more explicit in explaining the each person/each
accident concept.

Two such policies are construed in the cases

cited by Metropolitan, also discussed in Nielsen7s opening brief.
While Metropolitan does not quote the exact language at issue
in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ostenson, 713 P.2d 733 (Wash. 1986),
it assures this Court that it is "substantially similar" to that in

That assertion implies that this Court will not conduct an
independent review of the law as it stood when Nielsen7s
entitlement arose, but will construe the law to comport with the
subsequent legislation. That notion is in conflict with the wellestablished rule that a party has a right to rely upon the
substantive law in effect at time a cause of action accrues.
Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1987).
13

the Nielsen policy. However, the policy in Ostenson actually read
"subject to this limit for 'each person' . . . " (Emphasis added).
Similarly, the policy construed in Standard Accident Insurance
Company of Detroit v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952) provided:
"Subject to the above provision respecting each person . . . "5 The
Nielsen policy neither refers to a "limit" or to "each person"
language.
Plainly, the drafters of the policies quoted above knew how to
make clear to a reasonable insured just what the per accident limit
was "subject to."

In this case, however, the policy utilizes a

non-specific statement that the each-accident provision is subject
to "this provision," but does not define what "this provision" is.
In response to that contention, Metropolitan explains that
"provision" is the same thing as "clause."

(Metropolitan's Brief,

p. 19) (sentence consists of "two separate clauses or provisions";
"two clauses or provisions.")

Yet Metropolitan itself uses, both

in its brief and in the policy, the word "provision" to express
various concepts that are beyond a mere "clause."
Metropolitan's

brief

applies

sentences or paragraphs.
2 0-21,

31-32).

the word

For example,

"provision"

to

entire

(See Metropolitan's brief, pp. 7, 16, 18,

In fact, Metropolitan

5

refers to

the

entire

In its brief, Metropolitan underscores the words "subject
to the above provision," ignoring the following words "respecting
each person." (Metropolitan's Brief, p. 21.)
14

limitation

section

at

issue

as

the

"limiting

provision."

(Metropolitan's Brief, p. 18.)
The word "provision" also is given several different meanings
within the policy itself. For example, pages 2 and 3 of the policy
refer to "the provisions of" a financial responsibility law and
"the provisions of" any other no-fault law. On page 3, the policy,
discussing

duplicative

policies,

refers

the

reader

to

"the

provisions of the policy providing the highest dollar limit of
benefits payable." In that context, Metropolitan apparently meant
"provisions" to refer to the entire text of a policy.
In a subsequent section, the policy also makes reference to
"the provisions of" premises insurance, worker's compensation or
disability benefits law, and personal injury protection benefits,
all in the same sentence.

(Policy, p. 10). Later in the policy,

reference is made to "the provisions of this policy relating to
appraisal

and

time

of payment and

of bringing

apparently referring to entire sections.

suit," again

(Policy, p. 19). As an

additional example, the final paragraph of the policy states that
the insured and Metropolitan agreed to be bound "by any award made
by the arbitrator(s) pursuant to this provision."

(Policy, p. 22) .

Yet "this provision" follows a seven-clause sentence expressing
numerous concepts. Either the term "this provision" refers to the
entire preceding arbitration section, or, employing Metropolitan's
15

theory of parsing, parties are bound only by awards made pursuant
to

the

last

thought

immediately

preceding

the

term

"this

provision." Obviously, Metropolitan would not claim that to be its
intent.
In light of the inconsistent usage of the word "provision" by
Metropolitan itself, it seems unreasonable to expect the average
insured to discern what the policy means with respect to "this
provision" in the uninsured motorist context.

The policy is

ambiguous, and should be construed against Metropolitan.
As its secondary position, Metropolitan asserts that Nielsen
has waived his right to claim coverage in an amount exceeding
$250,000.

Support for this proposition consists largely of the

Barbara Maw affidavit, which is improperly raised for the first
time as an attachment to Metropolitan7s brief, and unsupported
discussions

of what Metropolitan

says Nielsen

intended.

(See

Metropolitan's Brief, pp. 24, 26.)
Metropolitan focuses on the assertion that Nielsen had an
opportunity to present his claim for full coverage prior to or
during the trial and failed to do so.

Therefore, Metropolitan

claims Nielsen has waived his right to make such arguments.
Metropolitan implies that the "trial" was to resolve Metropolitan's
liability, which was not the case.

The trial was only to decide

the personal injury claim against the tort feasors O'Reilly and
16

French, i.e. the fault of the accident and the amount of Nielsen's
damages.

The jury was not asked to determine Metropolitan's

liability.

Metropolitan was not even on the verdict form.

The liability of Metropolitan was decided by the judge after
the "trial." All of these issues on appeal were raised and briefed
before the trial court ruled on Metropolitan's liability. In fact,
it

was

impossible

for

the

trial

judge

to

even

address

Metropolitan's liability until after the personal injury trial.
The overriding factor, however, is that Metropolitan has not
alleged or established any of the elements of waiver, namely,
knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a known right.

Morgan v.

Ouailbrook Condominium Co. , 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). Metropolitan
offers no reason for why the extent of its policy limits was an
issue required to be established before the personal injury trial,
particularly when it refused to offer Nielsen even the $250,000
which it claims to be the limit.

Furthermore, Metropolitan's own

arguments are inconsistent, precluding the company from relying
upon Nielsen's alleged inconsistencies to establish waiver.
As a final note, it should be noted that all of the citations
by Metropolitan in its waiver argument refer to Nielsen's counsel.
Utah law is clear that an attorney cannot waive substantive rights
of his client, Mecham v. Benson. 590 P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 1979), and
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therefore such comments would not be binding upon Nielsen in any
event.
III. NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT DUE UNDER HIS UM
COVERAGE.
Nielsen submits that pre-judgment interest should be awarded
on the amount due under his contract with Metropolitan, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1.

As in any other contract claim, the fact

that Metropolitan contests its liability or the amount due does not
relieve the company of paying pre-judgment interest on the amount
the court finds owing under the contract.
Metropolitan's

sole argument against this point

is that

Nielsen's claim for insurance proceeds is properly characterized as
a personal injury action, rather than contract, and that the amount
due was therefore not reasonably calculable prior to trial.
Metropolitan's argument

is directly contradicted

by this

Court's holding in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795
(Utah 1985).

In Beck, this Court held that an insurance company's

obligation to its insured for uninsured motorist coverage is
grounded in contract, not tort.

When this Court decided Beck, it

undoubtedly knew that the obligation to pay UM coverage arises out
of a personal injury accident, but that fact did not change the
Court's view of the relationship between insured and insurer as

18

based

in contract.

Metropolitan's

obligation to Nielsen is

contractual.
Metropolitan attempts to distinguish Beck by arguing that this
is not an action against an insurance company; lf[n]o suit has been
filed against Metropolitan with regard to coverage nor have any
claims been made." This argument is difficult to comprehend.

All

of the issues which this Court is asked to decide in this appeal
concern Metropolitan's liability to Nielsen under the insurance
contract.
Once the contractual nature of Nielsen's relationship with
Metropolitan is acknowledged, Nielsen's entitlement to pre-judgment
interest on the sum owing under the contract becomes clear.

As

Metropolitan itself notes in its brief, insurance contracts are
construed the same as other contracts.

In other

jurisdictions

where the relationship between insured and UM insurer is deemed
contractual, courts have recognized the obligation of UM carriers
to pay

pre-judgment

interest

obligation to the insured.

on the entire

amount

of their

See, e.g., Brinkman v. AID Insurance

Co. , 766 P.2d 1227, 1234-35 (Idaho 1988), and State Farm Automobile
Insurance

Co. v. Reaves. 292 So.2d

95, 102-03

(Ala. 1974),

discussed in Nielsen's opening brief. As the Alabama Supreme Court
stated in Reaves:
Certainly, there may be disagreements between insurer and
insured as to how much (or whether any sum) is rightfully
19

due, and that disagreement ultimately may have to be
settled in a court of law. But such is true of other
contract actions as well.
Id. at 103.
Metropolitan

does

not

refute

this

case

law.

Instead,

Metropolitan argues that the amount owing was not calculable with
reasonable mathematical certainty. Unfortunately, that argument is
again based upon the erroneous assertion that Nielsen's claim is
one for personal injury. Furthermore, it ignores case law cited in
Nielsen's opening brief.
entitled

to

pre-judgment

Those cases hold that an insured is
interest,

even

in

non-contractual

situations, where the insurer knew, or should have known, that it
would have to pay policy limits to the insured.

See, e.g., Shafer

v. Automobile Club International Insurance Exchange, 778 S.W.2d
395, 399 (Mo.App. 1989); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Bishop, 329 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1976); United Services Automobile
Association v. Winbeck, 637 P.2d 996 (Wash.App. 1981).
Metropolitan's response to the principle set forth in such
cases is to assert that it disputed the damages and its liability
to Nielsen.

It does not follow, however, that Metropolitan's

refusal to pay under the contract was reasonable or in good faith.
While Metropolitan's unreasonableness is a separate ground, not a
prerequisite, for recovery of pre-judgment interest on the contract
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amount, at the very least this issue is factual which should be
resolved by a trier of fact.
In summary, Nielsen is entitled to pre-judgment interest on
the entire amount this court finds owing under his contract with
Metropolitan.

Nielsen's claim for coverage under the policy is

grounded in contract, rather than tort, and thus Metropolitan is
liable for interest as in any other contract action.

Even if the

action were considered one for personal injury, a factual issue
exists as to whether Metropolitan knew or should have known that
Nielsen's damages exceeded policy limits.
IV.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NIELSEN IS ENTITLED
TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE SPECIAL
DAMAGES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-44.

Nielsen claims, in the alternative, that he is entitled to
pre-judgment

interest on the amount of his

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44.

special damages,

Metropolitan argues that

its obligation to Nielsen is limited solely to the amount of the
policy limits. Metropolitan's argument is based upon the language
of the policy, which obligates Metropolitan to pay,
[A] 11 sums which the insured or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages because
of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of an uninsured highway vehicle . . .
(Policy, p. 7 ) .
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Metropolitan contends that the above language relieves it of
liability for pre-judgment interest in excess of its policy limits.
In support of that position, Metropolitan cites an insurance
treatise and some cases in which the word "damages" is construed to
include pre-judgment interest.
Metropolitan's argument ignores the fact that under Utah law,
insurance contracts are to be construed not in a technical legal
sense, but rather in accordance with the understanding of the
average, reasonable purchaser of insurance.

Draughon v. Cuna

Mutual Insurance Co. , 771 P. 2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989) . An ambiguous
provision regarding liability for interest must be construed in
favor of the insured, 15A Couch on Insurance 2d § 56:11 (1983) , and
the reasonable expectations of the insured are to be given effect
where possible. Wagner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763
(Utah App. 1990).
Nowhere in the quoted provision of the Nielsen policy is there
any language which would lead a reasonable insured to know that the
limitation applicable to "damages" includes pre-judgment interest.
The insured certainly cannot obtain such an understanding from the
definition of "damages" provided in the policy:
"damages" with respect to bodily injury includes damages
for care and loss of services resulting therefrom, and
with respect to property damage, damages for loss of use;
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(Policy, Definitions for Part 1, p. 4, incorporated by reference
into Definitions for Part 3f p. 7.)
Nowhere in that definition, or anywhere else in the policy, is
there any reference to pre-judgment interest.

It is simply not

reasonable to argue that to an average insured, the limitation on
the amount Metropolitan would pay for "damages" includes prejudgment interest.

The policy is not clear on what is meant by

"damages," and therefore must be construed in favor of Nielsen.
Regardless of the meaning of the term "damages" in the policy,
Metropolitan's argument is flawed in two other respects. First, as
illustrated by the case law cited above, courts have held that an
insurer's obligation for interest is not restricted by the amount
of policy limits where the insurer knows, or should know, that the
insured is entitled to policy limits, but nonetheless refuses to
pay.

(See discussion

under

Point

III, page

20.)

Whether

Metropolitan falls within that category is a factual issue to be
determined by a trier of fact.
An additional defect in Metropolitan's argument is the fact
that

interest

on

special

damages

is

statutorily

mandated.

Insurance contracts must be construed in conformity with the law.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-35 (1983).

Consequently, a provision in an

insurance policy which conflicts with Utah statutory requirements
is void or must be construed in accordance with the law.
23

Thus, even if Metropolitan's construction of the contract term
"damages" were correct, the contract must still provide for the
payment

of statutorily mandated pre-judgment

interest

on the

contract obligation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in Nielsen's opening
brief, Nielsen respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
district court's order of summary judgment, and to remand with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of Nielsen or to have
factual issues determined by a trier of fact.
DATED this 2 $ ^ day of May, 1991.
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